Typhoon aims to be minimal and secure. We're running it ourselves after all.
- etcd with peer-to-peer and client-auth TLS
- Generated kubelet TLS certificates and
- Role-Based Access Control is enabled. Apps must define RBAC policies
- Workloads run on worker nodes only, unless they tolerate the master taint
- Kubernetes Network Policy and Calico Policy support 1
- Container Linux auto-updates are enabled
- Hosts limit logins to SSH key-based auth (user "core")
- Cloud firewalls limit access to ssh, kube-apiserver, and ingress
- No cluster credentials are stored in Matchbox (used for bare-metal)
- No cluster credentials are stored in Digital Ocean metadata
- Cluster credentials are stored in Google Cloud metadata (for managed instance groups)
- Cluster credentials are stored in AWS metadata (for ASGs)
- No account credentials are available to Google Cloud instances (no IAM permissions)
- No account credentials are available to AWS EC2 instances (no IAM permissions)
- No account credentials are available to Digital Ocean droplets
Typhoon limits exposure to many security threats, but it is not a silver bullet. As usual,
- Do not run untrusted images or accept manifests from strangers
- Do not give untrusted users a shell behind your firewall
- Define network policies for your namespaces
Typhoon uses upstream container images and binaries. We do not currently distribute materials of our own.
If you find security issues, please email dghubble at gmail. If the issue lies in upstream Kubernetes, please inform upstream Kubernetes as well.
networking = "calico". Calico is the default on AWS, bare-metal, and Google Cloud. Digital Ocean is limited to
networking = "flannel". ↩